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Abstract 
In Indonesia, the societies have a long history as a runaway society 
and fugitive from the state-making projects. Many historical accounts prove 
that people escape from the state projects, such as corvee labor, wars, 
diseases and epidemics, conscriptions, slavery, taxes, violence, warfare, 
diseases, and poverty. In general, this paper describes the state-society 
relations and examines the meaning of the non-governed society. This paper 
questions what distinguishes between govern and non-governed society, 
what kind of social economy and cultural life of non-governed society that 
distinguishes from a governed state? To answer these questions, this paper 
explores the distinction of the governed and the non-governed society, 
which live in the different geographical areas. This paper explains the 
distinctions and frictions between lowland and highland society in 
Indonesia, in terms of social economy, kinship, political organization, and 
religion. In the last reflection, the author argues that non governed society 
is not only people who live in the upland and far from the centralized 
bureaucracy, rather they also live in the middle of dense population of a 
town and even under a most centralized and autocratic regime.  
 
Keywords: Geography of the Highland and Lowland, non Governed 
Society, Resistance, Anarchism.  
 
1. Frictions of Lowland and Highland 
The geographical landscape in Southeast Asia allows cultural 
differences and frictions between lowland and highland society. Upland 
society in Southeast Asia has its uniqueness. The ecological contours range 
from Southern China to North East India, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 
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Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia consists of the ranging mountain, 
marshes, swamps, fens, bogs, moors, deltas, mangrove coasts, hills, valleys, 
lowlands, coast complex waterways and archipelagoes, and sea. These 
natural geographical conditionslead to the different structural and cultural 
compositions.  
The areas in the upland and periphery, which are also called “non-
state societies” also exist in the entire world, such as Berber and Bedouin 
Communities in the Middle East, Indian communities in the USA or 
Bushmen in Africa. However, unlike stateless societies in the Middle East 
and North Africa that have similar religious background and geographical 
conditions2, in Southeast Asia people who live in the upland have not only 
different geographical places to live but also different religious 
backgroundsfrom the people in the state areas living in the lowland.People 
who live in the upland also have different cultural practices with the people 
in the low land, in terms of dress, languages, dialects, foods, architectures, 
the patterns of cultivationand religion (Scott, 2010: 18). The culture of 
lowland society is religiously dominated by Muslims and people in the 
upland is much influenced by the Indian, pagan model and lately Christian 
religions. Besides the uneven geographic of Southeast Asia, the difference of 
culture between lowland and highland is also predominantly determined by 
modes of productions. The lowland people live in sedentary because they 
have to cultivate paddy, which needs intensive maintenance. By contrast, 
people in the highland cultivate crops such as cassava, wild yam and taro, 
which do not need intensive care.  
One of the frictions between highland and lowland in Southeast Asia 
is because the state imposes their power to the upland society that has 
different religions and cultures. State, which is mostly located in the 
lowland; consider themselves the governed, civilized and tame society. On 
the other hand, the upland communities are wild, uncivilized and 
ungoverned. This opposition reflects to the idea of raw and cooked 
opposition as described by Levi Strauss (1983). The raw food is like the 
ungoverned people who are not touched by civilization, while the governed 
society is a trope of a cooked meal, which has been touched by modernity 
and development.  
To civilize people in the hill and to bring political aims, the lowland 
societies spread religion and pieties in order for people in the upland have 
the same discourse, language, and imagination. In fact, highlanders in 
Southeast Asia have different religions than people living in lowland areas. 
Massive state missionaries have converted highlanders to embrace one of 
the religions that are authorized by state’s recognition, such as Buddhism, 
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Christianity or Islam. In Indonesia for example, the state forces the 
Tenggerese to embrace Hinduism (Heffner, 1990). Likewise the state also 
forces Dayak people in remote Kalimantan to convert to Christianity 
(Tsing, 1985). Anna Tsing (1985) points out that the Banjarese of lowland 
Southwest Kalimantan try to convert the Meratus, people in the upland. 
According to the Banjarese, the Meratus are pagan and still uncivilized 
because they do not embrace Islam as an official religion, which is also 
recognized by the state.Another ethnographic case is from the study of 
Patricia Spyer on Aru People in Southeast Moluccas (1987). She shows that 
the state forces people from upland Bemuneseto embrace Catholics 
otherwise they are treated as the second-class citizen. 
Nevertheless, the frictions of lowland and upland society do not make 
them live in total dichotomy and separation. Rather the frictions are 
because they have long historical contact that creates different way of life 
and mode of productions3. The lowland society is also dependent on the 
products in the highland, because the highland suppliesbamboo, rattan, 
timbers, fruits, as well as staples such as yam, potatoes, and maize. On the 
other hand, the highlanders need product from the lowland, such as dried 
fish, salt, ironware and clothes, thread, blankets, matches and kerosene, 
porcelain and potter and even weapons.  
 
2. Lowland Agrarian State:  Accumulation of Manpower and Grain 
Productions 
In this sub section, my paper argues that the different of geographical 
landscape leads to the distinction of the cultural way of life. I give broader 
examples in Southeast Asia to make a sense that people in Indonesia also 
have the same experience. They live in the rugged landscape as in other 
Southeast Asian countries. This condition makes obvious cultural 
differences between people who live in the highland and the lowland. The 
aim to describe these differences is to show that although a State has an 
influential power to change the highlanders, the lowland society itself is 
very vulnerable to many social and political problems,as I will describe 
below.  
James Scott in his work The Art of Not Being Governed (2010) tracks the 
history of sedentary people as the early state in Southeast Asia. He believes 
that agro-ecology and mode of production determine the forms of social-
political structure and religion. The emergence of the state in Southeast 
Asia was because of two factors. First is the concentration of population and 
second is the abundance of grain supplies (Scott, 2010: 5-7). Scott also finds 
that before colonialism brought the idea of the value of land, the most 
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important commodity in the early Southeast Asian was manpower. The 
revenue of the early state was based on the ability to mobilize manpower as 
political capital. The concentration of slaves has to do with the sedentary 
agriculture because manpower is required to raid “stateless people” and also 
to plant and maintain grains. At the moment, we can also see, people are 
concentrated in the area of rice fields, like in Java Island, since the increase 
of grain production leads to population growth. As a result, dense 
population requires hierarchy and finally creates the establishment of state. 
Geertz (1981) and Dwipayana (2001) provides examplesof how the 
accumulation of people through war and slave trade is one of the origins of 
social hierarchy and centralization typical of agrarian state in Bali, 
Indonesia.From the explanation above, we can see that Indonesiaand 
Southeast Asia, before the colonialism, did not engage in slaughtering 
people, because the value of people is more important than land.  
The lowland towns are located in the central of wet rice areas because 
they are determined by irrigation systems. The irrigated rice cultivation 
makes possible a paddy core as the center and creates paddy state as a 
subject around the court. Yogyakarta, Surakarta and Cirebon courts, for 
example, are located in the center of huge wet rice areas.Benedict Anderson 
(2006) uses the concept of Mandala as the best example in describing the 
concept of power in Java. To illustrate his point, Anderson associates Java 
to the power of light. Java’s power fades as one moves away from the city 
similarly to how light dims. Java is the center that holds the power of a light 
and the power evades when it goes to the periphery.  
Scott(2010: 161)shows his Marxist views by arguing modern 
civilizationsare built from slavery concentrations. He believes that the 
heterogeneity of lowland societies is because the town was consisted of 
slaves, conscriptions and captives of wars that were brought to the center4. 
The heterogeneity of social ranks are resulted from the political coercive 
such as wars and invasions. He gives examples of the massive deportation of 
conscriptions from the Shan Hills during the 1760-1780 in Burma, and 
central Siam in the early nineteenth century, which captured war prisoners 
from Laos and Mon. The surplus of grains stimulates birth rates and 
absorbs slave to occupy the agrarian state. On the other hand, the surplus of 
manpower also stimulates grain productions. The capital in the agrarian 
state is created through the works of slaves, coolies, and conscriptions. 
Their power is used to create more grain continuously. Prior to the 
institution of money, the production of grain and manpower was a sign of 
wealth. Because of the grain and manpower, the state could create a further 
development. They are able to develop complex bureaucracy and create 
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military to invade “stateless people”. Scott calls this as “entourage politics” 
in which manpower is the main capital to develop political economy and 
technology (Scott, 80-82). 
 
In Southeast Asia, the manpower of slaves is the basis of the 
establishment and progress of the early state. The production of paddy and 
its irrigation is a direct result of slave raiding. Without slavery, there would 
be no concentration of manpower. The ancient agrarian state, the state 
captures people such as hunter-gatherers and animist swidden cultivators 
that are weak and not concentrated in one area(Scott, 2010: 85-6). In 
Mataram Court that is located in Central Java for example, the court 
captured the Blambangan people, a rebellion community from Eastern Java 
Island. The people of Blambangan were captured since they failed to 
appropriate tributeto the court. The Mataram troops burnt the disobedient 
and deported the people to the center of the court areas and used the 
captivatedpeople of Blambangan as slavery (Margana, 2012).When the court 
could captivate many people, the manpower would work well and the 
dynasty would become cosmopolitan with various languages and 
cultures.Therefore, the construction of the cultural hybridity is based on the 
subjugation of the manpower, in which the state employed the conscription 
as slavery. 
People in the lowland area also learn how to build and arrange 
organizations through irrigation systems. They also learn on how to 
maintain the surplus food. Agrarian states also create “the middlemen” or 
“local strongmen” who collecttaxes for the state5. However, they usually 
manipulate or smuggle the taxes that is supposed to a deposit to a state. 
Henk Schulte Nordholt and Van Till’s story on the local strongmen around 
Kediri, East Java in the mid nineteenth century shows that although the 
productions of crops are measurable and written down, middlemen 
intentionally makethese number of productions unreadable in order to 
keep an amount for themselves. This is the first emergence of thugs and 
corruptions happen in the rice areas (Nordholt and Van Till, 1999) 
Additionally, a lowland society could also create rich material cultures 
in; diet, cuisine, plow animals, architectures, and transportations and 
communication. The lowland state also could develop monument and 
substation6 due the lowland societiesalready have a writing culture, 
especially on survey and taxes, they are able toproduce beautiful literature 
like novels and poems. On the other hand, people in the periphery or 
upland areas tend to rely on the oral tradition. Therefore, we can see that in 
Surakarta court, Ranggawarsita, a very well known poet, just emerged in the 
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nineteenth century. The poems did not emerge in the early period of the 
paddy state, because most of the writing in the early state was on survey of 
taxes and land. The literature emerged through a very mature agrarian state 
(Sears, 1996).  Therefore, writing tradition tends to belong to the court and 
state that is located in the lowland. Unlike lowland society that has a long 
tradition of writing culture, the highlanders do not rely on the writing 
tradition. They are a society that mostly uses oralityas their daily speaking. It 
does not mean that they are illiterate, but orality is another way to keep 
people’s memories in the mind, so that the lowland state could not track 
their memories, histories and cultures. Thus, non-literate society has many 
hidden transcripts in their mind. Their oral tradition is like the tradition of 
cultivating root crops, such as cassava, potatoes and yams. Nobody knows 
how many crops are under the ground that is planted. Keeping memories in 
the mind and in the oral is like a hidden transcript7.  
Unlike a written tradition, oral stories are easily changed and 
developed. This strategy is also to avoid the state’s goal tracking the 
highlanders’ movement. Hence, in Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general, 
there are many different versions of folk stories that are transferred through 
oral traditions8. Oral story is a way richer and more various than written 
tradition. When the oral stories are transferred to the next generation, the 
stories are usually changed or developed according to the current 
interpretations and conditions. By contrast, the existence of text creates 
orthodoxy where people keep maintaining the standard account of the text. 
Text creates orthodoxy and class hierarchy. The lowland has many clerics, 
people who master in keeping the standard account of the holy text, such as 
Qur’an and Bible. To anyone who can read text very well, they will get 
privileges of class. Therefore, we can see many orthodox and puritan people 
in the lowland areas, but not in the highland.  
For highlanders, a text is associated with state forces. Text is very 
crucial for technology of administration and statecraft. The lowlanders need 
text for conducting land survey, accounting population and taxes, recording 
wage, contracting labor, creating specific agreement of trade and developing 
literature. Therefore, the highlanders consciously escape from the state 
because written traditions have enormous instrumental value to the process 
of permanent political centralization and administration. On the contrary, 
oral traditions have substantial advantages for free people who are 
independent from the state.  
The density of population and a surplus of grainin the agrarian 
stateslead to a complicated classstructure and property inequalities.  
Sedentary agriculture tendsto concentrate peopleand create bureaucracy 
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and produce “middle class” occupations such as surveyors, architects, 
playwrights, artisans, dancers, actors, traders, and accountants.The 
conditions of sedentary life and the emergence of bureaucratic 
apparatusesmake low land society relatively easy to control and to calculate. 
They are easy to control through survey such as registration in the form of 
fiscal taxes, which are either taxes on trade or taxes on landholding. 
Therefore, people are not allowed to move without explicit permission from 
the state. In addition, to make legible, survey of population tend to classify 
and simplify populations into ethnic, religion and race classifications. This 
simplification aims to make people visible, so that the system of government 
can run effectively. Scott in his book Seeing like a State (1999) believes that 
the classification of tribes or ethnic groups is a political project. In addition, 
sedentary societies are easily to control because they are highly concentrated 
in one place and they never move like upland society. Since sedentary 
people have more stable settlement, they usually have fix identity than 
people in the upland who move along the time. This condition also answers 
the questions why anthropologists have more difficulties in defining the 
identity of the people who live in the remote or upland areas, such as Dayak 
or Papuan, than describing people in lowland such as Shan or Javanese.   
However, people in sedentary agricultural societies are actually very 
prone to disease. Once plagues come, they are easily infected. For example, 
the plagues from the rats can devastate the harvest because the plagues 
attack all of the grain in the stores. When the harvest fails, people startto 
run to the highland to avoid the disease and famine. Scott gave the example 
of Hantawaddy, people who live in the lowland Burma. They moved to the 
highland because of the long drought that caused crop failure and famine, 
in between 1803 and 1813 (Scott, 2010: 160).In the Indonesian case, David 
Henley, shows that people in the lowland towns are also fragile to suffer 
diseases. Henley, who focused his studies on the Minahasan society in the 
North Sulawesi, found that epidemic diseases, specifically smallpox, spread 
very easy in the crowded and sedentary settlement. He also indicates that rat 
epidemicwas a major obstacle to the population growth in the North 
Sulawesi(Henley, 2005: 286 Scott, 2010: 159) 
Scott provides three answers of why the crown in the traditional 
lowland society fails to establish modern state? First, he considers that “the 
crops is legible, but the officials were not”, which means that middlemen 
like officials and the aristocracy, manipulates information to the crown 
regarding with state revenue and taxes. Second, the fluctuation of weather, 
pests and crops diseases, and human diseases such as cholera cause harvest 
failure and famine. These conditionsare worsened by the fact that gangs, 
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thugs, thieves and bandit dominate certain grains or crops for their own 
interests.Third, early agrarian stateshave tremendous capriciousness in 
political economic systems. There is no rational accounting surplus of 
grains. Thus, although seem steady and strong, agrarian statesare actually 
fragile to the diseases and the bankruptcy (Scott, 2010: 96).  
 
3. Non-State Spaces in Southeast Asia and Indonesia  
This subsection aims to describe the fragile of the State in building 
their power against corruption, political instability, huge numbers of 
population and epidemic of diseases. By contrast, I depict the effectiveness 
of living with small communities in the highland societies. They have more 
food security as well ass stability in the social and political structure. 
Robert Heffner and Edmund Leach weretwo prominent scholars who 
studied the cultural history of Southeast Asian highlanders. Highland areas 
are noted as the strategic hiding place for rebels. Heffner showed that 
Tengger Highland in East Java province has becoming a strategic place for 
people to run from the state. For more than 250 years, Tengger highland 
has been a comfortable place to hide from state forces and political 
violence. Heffner (1990)9describes the Tenggerese run along with the 
collapse of Madjapahit, a Hindu-Buddhist Kingdom in the thirteenth 
century. People run away from Madjahapit to escape from the courts and 
aristocracy of a newly established Islamic kingdom. Likewise, during the 
Dutch colonial period, the Madurese rebels like Untung Surapati, an ex-
slave, also hid in Tengger in the 167010. Tengger highland also became a 
strategic place for communists who runaway from state killing in the 1965.   
Edmund Leach studies about the comparative political systems 
ofShan people living in the lowland and Kachin people in the hill11. Leach 
distinguishes between the two societies, Shan people who live in the 
lowland and Kachin people who live in the upland. Regardless of the 
different between Shan and Kachin people, they are connected through a 
common language, alliances of marriages and political systems.  The Shan 
people embrace Buddhism and work in the rice agriculture. They have a 
stratified feudal structure (mong) with the highest chief called saohpa. By 
contrast, the Kachin people are non-Buddhist. They are not bounded 
communities, but more heterogeneous and have various languages and 
dialects.They have blurred territories, and each community has diverse 
motif of clothes and variety of ecological organizations.  
Leach found that it was easy to define Shan people compared to the 
Kachin people. Shan people have a more homogenous culture, whereas 
Kachin communities are not easy to put into a simplified category. Kachin 
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people have two different kinds of political systems called Gumsa and 
Gumlao. The Gumsa system is a state structure and has feudal hierarchical 
systems. Leach claims that Gumsa system is relatively unstable because 
middle class aristocrats constantly try to reach to the top-rank of lineage 
systems. In addition, the common people also try to transform themselves 
to a higher rank in the system. On the contrary, Gumlao system is 
anarchistic and egalitarian. This mode of social and political organization is 
a tribute to the resistance of state control conducted by Shan People. 
However, as an egalitarian system, Gumlao could be effectively strategic as 
long as the community does not consist of large people, unless the society 
will be divided into hierarchical systems like in Gumsa (Leach, 1954).  
Leach also points out that the alliance between Kachin and Shan is 
established through the matrilineal cross cousin. A man is expected to 
marry his mother's brother's daughter. Kachin people have relations with 
Shan people in terms of wife takers and wife givers. In this case, the wife 
giver (mayu) has a higher political rank compared to the wife taker (dama). 
In the gumsa system, the relationship between mayu and dama is used to 
legitimate a rank in the political hierarchy (Leach, 1954: 203-204). The wife 
taker is the follower of the wife giver. The weakness of the asymmetric 
system of mayu and dama is the marriage tends not to be reciprocal, rather 
to create a new subordination and slavery to the wife taker. In the case of 
Shan and Kachin society we can see that women are the actors who 
intermediate economic exchanges between highland and lowland.  
Shan and Kachin have long deep historical connections in the field of 
economics and politics. The Shan political system also recruits some figures 
from Kachin society. In addition, the chiefs from Kachin sometimes adopt a 
political system from Shan feudalistic system12. The feudalistic system of the 
San society is suitable to implement in the system of gumsa in Kachin 
society. Kachin people who implement the gumsa system eventually are also 
regarded as Shan people because they are more ambitious, individualist, 
and feudal. Many of Kachin people also convert to be a Buddhist. Thus, for 
Kachin people who embrace Buddhism are regarded as Shan people.  
Leach’s research shows that internal mechanism in the hill society 
changes since the influence of the political and economic transformation 
coming from outside (Leach, 1954: 212). The external factors are, first, 
Kachin people found the availability of material resources and production 
from Shan society. Secondly, the political influences from British 
colonialism. Lastly are the individual political actions from the gumlao 
system itself, which have ambitions to change the egalitarian system within 
gumlao(Leach: 1954: 227-263). 
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*** 
Although the highlanders are mobile, they have steady social structure 
comparably to the lowland political organizations. Lowland political 
organizations are very prone to the history of rebellions and coups. The 
lowland structural politics consist of middle class bureaucrats, armies and 
aristocracies that have strong political desire to over throw the throne and 
take matters in their own hands. The facts of coup have been proven on 
Java Island. Javanese history is full of coup narratives such as the story of 
Ken Arok and the collapse of Madjapahit Kingdom. The collapse of the 
latter story was because of the rebellion from Demak kingdom, which came 
from the inner families of Madjapahit court itself. The most popular is the 
story of Soeharto’s coup in 1965 that was followed by the big ideological 
transformations and the changing of social political organizations. In 
addition, the colonial regimes also have a strong influence to interfere with 
the lowland social political organizations. Highlander’s social-political 
organizations are way more stable because they are not consisted of huge 
and complicated social structure like in the lowland societies. The 
highlanders have no complicated middle class and they are also almost 
untouched by modern colonial administrations.  
Learning from Robert Heffner and Edmund Leach, James Scott 
studies the Zomia people who live across modern state boundaries. Zomia 
live in the upland of Burma, Laos, and North East India. They live in in the 
zone of refugees and resist state projects. Hills are comfortable space of 
political resistance to the state. Hill societies produce surplus of production, 
but they do not send that surplus to support kings and monks in lowlands. 
Upland society has sovereign space because of the rugged areas. Specifically 
during the rainy seasons, the state faces difficulties to invade and control 
the upland area.  
People in the highland are not an isolated community. They are 
connected with other highland communities. The highlanders intentionally 
make decisions to run away from the state. They have their own choice to 
be independent from the state. Highlander’s systems of livelihood, such as 
shifting cultivation, slash and burn, hunting and gathering, drive them to 
be invisible from state’s surveillance. Since highlanders have experiences 
running from the state, they learn how to live in a mobile lifestyle. Using 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory on “rhizomatic society”, James Scott believes 
that upland communities have local mechanism to build complex 
independent and horizontal networks without a centralized power and state 
hierarchy (Scott, 2010: 29). Therefore, the highlanders have freedom of 
mode of production as long as they keep away from the state. They do not 
Kawalu: Journal of Local Culture Vol 3, No. 2 (July - December), 2016 
 
34 
have to work for the landlord or the employer; instead they work only for 
their own labor power. This is because the highlanders do not have to pay 
taxes and do not have to pay rent for the land.   
Shifting cultivation methods also lead to the emergent of plural 
societies. People in the hill or in the remotes areas need more manpower, 
and they have long experiences of adding strangers as a part of their 
families. Hill societies incorporate new outsiders, such as runaway slaves, as 
their kinship. Unlike lowland society, hill societies do not adopt newcomers 
into a class order; by contrast, they attach new comers to descendent groups 
or kindred. Because of the kinship flexibility toward immigrants, people in 
the hills have flux social organizations, which is different from lowland 
societies that have permanent and immutable identities. Non State-societies 
in the hill have a continuous process of change. The shifting cultivators and 
hunter-gatherers are not totally a primitive group living in a bounded 
society. They are very exclusive in accepting new migrants. They do not live 
in the bounded areas and bounded total social and political units; instead 
highlanders are very “cosmopolite” since they do not have single identities 
like sedentary people in the lowland.  
Unlike lowlanders that have firm identity in defining insider and 
outsider, the highlanders are very mobile and do not belong to one ethnic 
identity. Furnivall (1948: 311) proves that the emergence of plural societies 
in the lowland is because of the condition of supply and demand, which 
creates the system of class. He notices that the conditions of plural society 
in the lowland tropical areas consisted of the native, the slave, the 
immigrants and the Europeans, which compete one another. Despite the 
cleavage in racial lines, each race has different mode of production and 
place of settlement. Plural society in the lowland areashas no idea of 
citizenship, because each community is automized into competition. The 
market drives people to produce and create the logic of profit by disturbing 
the cohesion of a social organism.  
In addition, the highlanders do not need granary givent hat root and 
tuber crops are naturally kept underground. They can just dig up the 
piecemeal of tubers anytime when they need it. Given that the crops are 
concealed underground, the state would not know its numbers and its 
capacities. Therefore, the state cannot apply taxes to the underground crops 
ownership. To cultivate tubers is only need moderate labor intensity. 
Although they have low value in cash economy, underground crops are 
needed as a staple food for highlanders. Additionally, underground crops 
are ecologically friendly to environment. Some crops, such as yam and 
cassava, can be planted in many varietiesof tropical climates (ibid, 203-5).  
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People in the highlands are usually healthier than people in the 
lowlands. First is because the shifting cultivation systems drive highlanders 
to move regularly. As a consequence, the highlanders are in good physics. 
Sedentary agriculture systems do not require people to move regularly. This 
is because they have to take care paddy crops that need intense 
maintenance. Secondly, highlands provide edible plants and fruits that have 
various nutrition comparably to lowlands that tend to cultivate mono crops. 
Thirdly, one benefit for highlanders is they avoid plagues, since they moved 
to anywhere else. On the contrary, lowlanders are at risk to get disease, such 
as cholera and pestilence, because they are remain in one place.  
However, massive modern state projects under the New Order regime 
in Indonesia considered that shifting cultivations is a backward activity. So 
that Indonesian state tried to control hunter-gatherers to stay in one place. 
Many of ethnographic works on Kalimantan peoplehave illustrated on how 
state apparatus implemented their control to the non-state society to live in 
accordance with state’s point of view. Michael Dove for example, he 
examines the way State implement their discipline and control to 
smallholders, in the all stages of production and its marketing, state 
reordering the landscape, mobilization of land and labor, to the daily 
household routines. The scheme of surveillance, and various 
implementations of geometrization, simplification, standardization and 
discipline, resemble to the structure of Panopticon that is popularized by 
Foucault(Dove, 2011: 30).  
 
4. Non-State Spaces in Moluccas-Eastern Indonesia  
Compared to two previous sub sections, in this sub section, I am 
more narrowing down my description on the people in small communities 
in the periphery of Indonesia. In Indonesia, non-state spaces are not only 
found in the upland. The sea is a huge place for people runaway from state 
control. The topography of Indonesia country ranges from volcano margins, 
highland to the open sea. A historian, Eric Tagliacozzo describes state 
presence and control in the Southeast Asian Sea. He explores small-scale 
insurgencies of Southeast Asian societies living in the seashore and outer 
islands. There are many variants of local violent reactions to the creation of 
state borders. People in the peripheries, such as Bangka Belitung, Aceh, 
Jambi, and Banjarmasin, reacted to the control and state-making projects 
(Tagliacozzo, 2005: 166). State projects creating sea boundaries lead to the 
sea traders’ insurgencies because borders curtail their economic activities. In 
other words, many nomadic and semi nomadic people consider sea 
boundaries are established by coercive actions because the state harms sea 
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people’s livelihood and culture13. Tagliacozzo relates his description with 
Arjun Appadurai’s concept, “paths and diversion”. A range of commodities 
has social lives to change according to time and place conditions. If a 
commodity crosses the border, the meaning of the commodity could 
change. State defines a legality commodity. Although the commodity is not 
dangerous, if the society exchanges it without state control, they could be 
illegal. Clove for example, could be regarded as contraband if they are 
traded without known by the Colonial state administration14.  
Although New Order regime had a strong control for more than 30 
years (1966-1998), people in the periphery could conduct any 
socioeconomic activities without involving the state interference15. Roy 
Ellen (2003) shows that Southeast Seram islands in Eastern Indonesia are a 
space where empty from state control and surveillance. Because of the 
topography and hydrography of the islands, Southeast Seram Islands have a 
“loose federation”. The center and periphery of the Moluccas were unstable 
and dynamic if compared to the centralized system of politics in the 
agrarian state of Java. Center areas such as Ternate and Ambon are very 
fragile because of political, wars and epidemics. In addition, the center 
system is fragile partly because there is no stable food production and 
significant local production of cash crops.  
The peripheral areas, such as the South East Seram Islands, consist of 
small state political organizations that shift over time. Radjas, the heads of 
small numbers of estates, transfer their rule through inter clan marriages. 
The radja, as the ruler, encourages having alliances and integration with 
outside polities (Ellen, 2003: 278-79). In other words, the center becomes 
unstable because of shifts in rule and kinship ties. This leads to shifting 
relations of tribute, subjugation, and alliance, and in some cases also the 
physical movement of settlements. The radja does not necessarily live on the 
island that he rules (ibid, 34). The jurisdiction and authority of a radja 
could extend across one island to another. One example is the Raja Kelu 
who had control over part of Seram Laut, but he preferred to live on Geser 
Island (ibid, 92-3).  
Ellen focuses his research on South East Seram Islands because these 
islands have two important roles. First, Southeast Seram islands are self-
sufficient. Secondly, they supply the dietary necessities for Banda and they 
channel products from and into Papua Island (Ellen, 64). In the 
contemporary trading networks, Ellen points out that the most intensive 
destination for boat movement is from the port of Banda to Geser, an 
island in Southeast Seram (ibid, 185-7).  
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Unlike Ternate, Tidore and Banda Island, the Southeast Seram 
Islands were less integrated into the world economy and less dependent on 
imports for basic subsistence. Each island reciprocally supplied basic 
necessities from gardening produce, such as vegetables, fruits, and sago, and 
fuel wood (ibid, 51).  The Kingdom on Tidore, which is located in the 
North Moluccas, and Serammers had different trade arrangements and 
modes of political operation. While Tidore trade entailed collection tribute 
from and politically dominating the Papuans, Southeast Seram islanders 
had a more equal system of trade. Instead of using symbolic power from the 
court of a sultanate, Serammers and Papuans conducted egalitarian trade 
(ibid, 122). The Southeast Serammers did not have “inherited statuses” like 
in Kingdom of Tidore. Intermarriage with Papuans occurred because of the 
trade networks rather than because of the raids. In other word, marriage 
was not aimed to incorporate Papuans as subjects into the wider centralized 
polity like what operated by the Tidore Kingdom (ibid, 130-1). 
Under the Dutch colonialism, small trader’s activities in Southeast 
Seram islands were unforeseen from the monopoly control of VOC. 
Southeast Seram Islands such as Seram Laut, Geser and Gorom Island were 
the place for refugees that fled to avoid slavery from Banda Island since the 
Dutch control in 1621. These islands were reputed as the rebels place. 
People in Southeast Seram sent kora-kora (war canoes) to Bandanese to 
evacuate them from the Dutch control and slaughtering. Indigenous people 
who survived in Banda Island were therefore enslaved. By using kora-kora, 
South East Seram also involved in the smuggling of cloves for violation of 
the VOC prohibition (Ellen, 82-3).  In 1633, Seram Laut and Southeast 
Seram were reported involved in the illegal spice trade that being smuggled 
by junks to Makassar. They also smuggled shell, pearls, bird of paradise, 
plumes, damar for exchanged with textiles, iron, and gun power (ibid, 86-7).  
 
Unlike islands in the Southeast Seram, Banda Island is state control 
area. The Dutch introduced a classic plantation mode of production 
(perkenierstelsel) by intensifying land use and rationalizing agricultural 
production. By the coming of coolies from Javanese and Chinese, the 
Dutch also transformed both the pattern of settlement and natural 
resources management. Since the island was transformed to the plantation, 
Banda had changed its division of labor and very dependent on rice from 
Java. By 1637 Banda Island was very dependent on the timber, fruits, 
vegetables, cattle production, coconut, sago, beans, and peas from Southeast 
Seram Islands (ibid, 85-86). Along with the growth of Banda Island as the 
center of spice production, Southeast Seram became the main important 
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periphery that buffered the necessities of Bandanese. Additionally, 
Southeast Seram Island are also independent islands, even in the pre early 
modern era. Ellen points out there was no evidence that people there sent 
goods and tribute to the Sultan of Tidore on a regular basis and people did 
not recognize the authority of sultan Tidore either (ibid, 124).  
Under the New Order regime, many traders in Southeast Seram 
Islands did not register their enterprise to the office administration located 
in central Ambon Island. In fact, the registration is important to collect 
taxes. Traders were successfully avoiding taxes for the wholesale exported 
products. In the 1986, Ellen reported that the avoiding of taxes reached to a 
critical level. The local government complaint that there were too much 
direct trade from Gorom Island (one of the islands in Southeast Seram) to 
Surabaya, the second biggest port in Indonesia (ibid, 234-236). This 
condition inflicted a financial loss to the local government because traders 
did not pay taxes varying between 5 to 10 percent based on the value of the 
goods. In conclusion, Southeast Seram traders have more than three 
hundred years experiences to live avoiding the state authority, despite the 
presence of VOC state control to customs office (kantor bea dan cukai) under 
the New Order regime.   
The Dutch also had difficulties in conquering people from Seram 
Island. The Dutch troops were based on the naval artillery forces. The 
broken paths and the deep of riverbeds made difficulties for the 
commanding officers. This condition was compounded by the rugged 
landscape and unknown terrain of Seram Island. People of Seram, which so 
called Alifuru, could easily hide and prepare for an ambush. Knaap also 
mentions that another major problem was difficulties in carrying drinking 
water and supplies to the upland. The big troops, which comprised about 
1,000 to 1,500 combatants, of whom some 50to 75 were VOC soldiers, 
were too complicated to move, to arrange and to communicate in the 
rugged areas, specifically in providing supplies and drinking water (Knaap 
2002: 177-79).  Therefore, the reasons why the Dutch could easily occupy 
Ambon, Lei Timor Peninsula and Banda Island, because geographically 
speaking these areas were located in the plain lowland.  
In contrast to Seram and Southeast Seram Island, Ambon Island became 
the central power of local government because of its advantageous natural 
terrain. The plain lowland located in the coastal areas was convenient to 
build a town, and since Ambon was on the coast, the fort was supported by 
naval power. On the contrary, mountains and hills in Seram Island and 
Hitu Peninsula were not suitable to be a center of political control not only 
because of their disadvantage in terrain, but these two rugged areas had 
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only small quantities of sulfur earth to produce gunpowder for war  (Knaap, 
2003: 175). There were also not many forts to block intruders attacking 
from the mountains and hillside. Too add, the heavy artillery stored in the 
coastal areas was not easy to haul up the narrow and steep paths of the hills 
and mountains. (Knaap, 2003: 175-76)  
 
5. Conclusion: Rethinking the Connections  
This paper challenges the existence of the modern State whether they 
can be an institution that promotes welfare, fairness, and peace to their 
citizens. Across the history, State that coerces their power to their people 
has not only leads to a total subjugation, but rather an avoiding. As a 
fledging States, Indonesia and any other States in Southeast Asia are still 
under arrangement. The high taxes followed by corruption and violence 
promoted by State apparatuses has shown that State can emerge only by 
forcing the people to follow their rules. The history of the safeguarding of a 
kingdom and the emergence of a modern State in the 19th century has 
followed by stories of wars and avoidance.  
State has a long record of raiding the highlanders and other non-State 
societies living in many various landscapes. This paper notes that the 
lowland societies have spread their power to the peripheries since the 
modern State is not established yet.From the kingdom era to the Dutch 
period, their power had organized the people in the periphery. The aim is 
not only to get the supply commodities, but also to use the human power 
from the periphery as a modality to accumulate State building projects.In 
ddition, the reason to invade the periphery areas is to occupy the territory, 
that later would be secure the State taxes. 
What I describe in this paper is not merely historical facts back in the 
past. But the reactions of the people in the Non State toward the Centric 
State are still occurring. In the post Reformasi era in Indonesia, the 
emergence of cultural revivalism have given a new warning to the State. The 
government is forced to deal fairly to the non-State societies who are also 
usually called “indigenous society”. The “barbaric” New Order State that 
sent the military to discipline and to punish the people in the Non State 
space only get the backlash and resistance from the people. Thus, the State 
that forces their power only buries themselves into their graveyard. In the 
end of the New Order for example, the periphery people raid to the forests 
and land that used to be claimed and owned by the State. Learning form 
the backlash, the post reformasi governance starts to think how treats the 
people in the non-State space in a more democratic way. Instead of pushing 
their power, the State gives the non-State society and people live in the 
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periphery areas to have more space in determining their life. In the 
euphoria of “revivalism of tradition” after the reformasi era, the Indonesian 
government takes into account on how to provide the freedom of 
indigenous people claiming their territory and land.  
The people in the periphery also becomemore globally connected 
because of the global demand of commodities. The highland forests and the 
small isolated islands in the Eastern Indonesia for example, provide 
commercial goods such as,copper, wood, resins, nutmeg,to sea 
cucumberthat are needed by people all over the world. Therefore, we can 
no longer consider that the non-State spaces are isolated from the 
commercial world. Far before the existence of the modern State, people in 
the periphery even have built their global connection through commodity 
supplies.  
I should admit that in this paper, there are more many scholars who 
conduct their research from the State centric narration. But I think it is 
extremely important to perceive the responses of the people residing in the 
peripheries or those who are living in the non-State spaces. Therefore, the 
discipline of anthropology, geography and history should give more a 
complementary understanding of studying people in the periphery and 
their responses to the current IndonesiaState projects.  
In the current phenomena, I conclude that people are no longer 
trying to take over the government immediately, but they trying to create a 
space outside of the State instead. The State avoidance nowadays is no 
longer occurred in the highland as I describe in this paper, but they emerge 
in the center of the towns, riverbanks, slums, and urban communities. 
People create their own sovereignty without trying to topple down the 
government. The autonomous spaces are a current trend nowadays; 
specifically when the State is ineffectively meet their citizen basic needs, 
such as water and electricity.  
Human beings have multiplicity of social relations that can work even 
without the states help. Through a multiplicity of persons, political 
institutions and the landscape of geography people can operate their 
networks of social economy. Therefore in the high modern State and 
society relations, the binary opposition between state and non-state society 
is challenged since several causes. First, although people in the upland areas 
are geographically and culturally different from the lowland, they have 
necessity to contact one another. The necessity of supply chain commodities 
between these two communities makes them to be connected. Secondly, 
individuals in the non-state society start to have ambitions to adopt the state 
system, because from doing that, they can absorb the power of state and re-
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create its power to their non-state society. To some degrees, non-state 
societies adopt the pattern of lowland cultures and State power because they 
see that State and lowland society are the source of the value, wealth, 
prestige and authority. In other words, people have ambivalent views 
towards the state. On one hand, people are very cynical of the government 
because the State often promotes brutality, corruption, and oppression. 
However, the modern state creates many development plans, which lure 
society into involvement in State policies.  Thirdly, we still should take into 
account that non-state societies still have an ambiguous combination of 
complicity and resistance to the lowland society. In other words, many non-
state societies the do not really support the ideology of the State; they rather 
combine State ideology with their traditional customs. This third thesis 
could be correct given that most of the state of Southeast Asia is fledgling 
state, in which the national government still does not have maximum power 
over periphery areas, such as South Seram and Seram Island.  
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes: 
                                                          
1
 Hatib Abdul Kadir is a lecturer in the Department of Anthropology at Brawijaya 
University. PhD student of Anthropology, at Department of Anthropology, University of 
California, Santa Cruz. He is also a co-founded http://etnohistori.org 
2 See example about Berber society in Morocco, in Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969) 1-2. Clifford Geertz. 1971. Religious Development 
in Morocco and Indonesia. University of Chicago Press.    
3 The differences of landscape of geography also influence the mode of livelihood 
distinction. Eric Wolf’s classic paper (1955) "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A 
Preliminary Discussion". Wolf divides two types of Latin American Peasantry, which is 
based on their locations. The lowland peasants are characterized as open type peasant to 
the world market. They cultivate cash crops, such as coffee, bananas, and sugarcane for the 
world market. The system of land ownership is private and the sense of community 
solidarity is weak. On the contrary, the highland smallholders are characterized as marginal 
society with limited technology, but they have strong sense of community rather than 
individual maximization of profit. Likewise, Robert Redfield’s study on Yucatan, Mexico 
(1941) shows that highland people has strong community solidarity against the outside 
world but they life in subsistence. On the contrary, lowland community relies on the cash 
crop such as vanilla and they live in a more individual competition.  
4James Scott’s argument is different from Gerrit J Knaap who conducts research on 
the history of Ambon town in the seventeenth century. Scott asserts that an emphasis in 
the early period of war was to catch people for slave labor rather than raiding the land. 
While Knaap indicates that to establish Ambon as a center of power, the VOC raided 
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periphery areas. Many villages were depopulated because of the massacre (Knaap, 2003, 
Collins, 2003). To establish Ambon as a center of power, the VOC raided periphery areas. 
The Dutch recruited mercenaries from the indigenous people because the colonizers lacked 
the manpower for conquest and also they did not know the landscape in the periphery 
areas as well as the indigenous. Following the conclusion of the wars in 1657, the Dutch 
started to develop Ambon to become a city of migrants. The companies and commerce 
sectors that served the VOC increased steadily from a few hundred to almost one thousand 
at the end of seventeenth century. The massive immigration of slave and prosperous 
Chinese communities to Ambon in 1650 contributed to huge economic growth (Knaap, 
1991: 110-111). Knaap also shows surprising data that slaves made up a larger portion of 
Ambon in the seventeenth century than any other demographic: 52.3 percent of the total 
population were male slaves who were sent from Buton, Makassar and Bali (Knaap, 1991: 
123-24).  
5Likewise, compared to upland societies, people in the lowland have a long history 
of being connected with the wider world. One example is a study from Fernand Braudel 
(1966) on the coastal communities that have conducted overseas trade since the pre-
modern world. Coastal traders in the Mediterranean have been connected to the exchange 
and commercial activities with traders from Philippines and Moluccas. Another study is 
from Anthony Reid (1993), which shows that people in Southeast Asia have been 
integrated through commercial activities and migration to the Venice and Istanbul. 
6 Unlike highland people who are mobile, the lowland state needs boundary to firm 
the insider and outsider. James Siegel (1993) and Abidin Kusno(2006), for example, have 
very well described the boundary of kampong territory to mark the outsider. The urban 
society living in the kampong creates gardu (guardhouse) to strengthen their identity and 
memory about the border. On the contrary, people in the highland do not construct gate 
as their mark of space boundary. They instead tattooed their body to show the identity and 
to mark clan and kinship affiliation.  
7 I borrow this concept from Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. 
Yale University Press, 1990. Root crops or escape crops are like “hidden texts”, in which 
the state could not account their numbers of production because of its illegibility. 
Therefore, roots can become one of the tools for highlander’s resistance. Tubers, such as 
sweet potatoes, yams, cassava, manioc, and yucca can be safely kept underground for two 
years (Scott: 2010: 195-6). The durability of their food supplies make highlanders secure for 
long time. This condition allows highlanders to survive if they are under attack by a state in 
the lowlands. Crops, which are planted in the high rugged mountains require little care 
and easily adapt to the swiddening routines.  
8Even in the contemporary Indonesian society, some communities still have 
traumatic experiences with writing traditions. The communities who live in the Code 
riverbank of Jogjakarta Town, still feel worried every time when they see outsiders bringing 
books, pens and jotting notes. They think that those people must be on behalf of the state. 
They certainly will take land survey; given Code communities in the riverbank do not have 
land certificates. They only have rights to use the land along the riverbank, but not to own 
it. The Code people have traumatic experiences with the scripts. They associate texts and 
scripts with the state forces and land grabbing. Therefore, Code people keeping their 
memories through verbal performances, such as utterances songs, verses, and poems. This 
is a very telling strategy to claim that they have a right to the land and to keep memorizing 
about their ancestor who had given shelter along the riverbank. However, it does not mean 
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that people in the Code are illiterate. They can read and write. To them, verbal culture is 
much more expressive than writing. There are a lot of words that cannot be expressed the 
script. They also do not have to be worried about grammatical errors, which is in the script 
is very easy to track.  
9  Surapati not only became a symbol of anti Dutch, but also a symbol of anti 
Mataram Court. He built alliances with Balinese and Blambangan, from Eastern Java, to 
oppose Mataram court, which is located in the lowland central Java. After the VOC 
(Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) crushed his alliances, Surapati fled to the mountain 
area in Tengger. When the Dutch seized him, his descendants and entourages still 
continued to put up resistance from Tengger Mountains. See also the story of Surapati in 
Kumar (1976) and Ricklefs (1981). 
10 The novel of Abdul Muis. 1999. Surapati, published by Balai Pustaka also well 
describes the struggle of Surapati against the Dutch and his fled to the highland until his 
death.  
11In making comparatives studies, Leach argues that instead of merely indexing a 
particular correlation of cultural traits of p,q,r  that is repeated in the cultural context of A, 
B, C…,He offers that we need to see the functional-structural logic behind the p,q,r…of 
different cultural contexts of A, B, C. What brings p,q,r into connection in the context A?. 
What brings p,q,r into  connection to the culture B? And so on. Secondly, is to compare 
and contrast the possible concepts of variations of the concatenation of p, q, r  …Third is to 
see in what circumstances the variables of p,q,r…is actually comparable. The outcome of 
these procedures is to see the contrast among cultures rather than its similarities (Leach, 
1968: 341).  
12Leach also argues that even though the lowland and upland society are culturally 
different, they are still connected into one another. This connection is not only in the 
terms social alliances, such as marriage, but also in terms of supply commodities. Edmund 
Leach gives examples in his study on Kachin Society. He points out that the way 
anthropologist works has much in common with an engineer. Leach considers that society 
is similarly to a variable of assemblages. Like a machine, each of the component parts in 
the society should interconnect with one another to balance the stability of a social system. 
Leach uses this definition of culture in studying structure of society in Burma. He believes 
that social structure is stable and balanced because the members of society are connected 
with one another although they are in a binary opposition, between highland and lowland 
society (Leach, 1961).  
13 In another place in Indonesia, sea tribe (orang suku laut) around Sumatera Island, 
also lives in the non-state areas. The sea gypsies (orang laut) live in their boats and across the 
waterways of archipelagoes and they do not have contact with the government. The sea 
gypsies have a long history run away from slavery, taxes, debt and any other governmental 
projects. They are boat dwellers and fish foragers who do not live in a sedentary mode. Like 
people in the upland, sea tribes do not have huge and complex mode of political 
organizations. Rather, they are more egalitarian since the chief lead each small community. 
See further Marsanto, Khidir, “Orang Suku Laut dan Orang Melayu di Kepulauan Riau: Sebuah Tafsir 
Deskriptif-Etnografis “Vol 31, No 3 (2010): Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia 
14 See further my discussion on this in “History of the Moluccan’s Cloves as a 
Global Commodity”. Kawalu: Journal of Local Culture Vol 1, No. 2 (July-December), 2014 
15In the modern era, one example of Non-sphere activities is on clove transactions. 
Under the New Order regime (1970s-1990s), the Ambonese were able to avoid the 
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dependency that was created by the KUD, Village Cooperative Unit (Koperasi Unit Desa). 
Instead of selling cloves to the KUD, producers tend to sell the cloves directly to the 
Chinese Merchants. Given that the KUD only receives production in limited scale, many 
producers are at a business disadvantage. Moreover, KUD only received clove with a 
certain degree of quality, while the Chinese accepted poor quality cloves and did not limit 
the amount of sold clove.  Trade is about trustworthiness and producers have a 
relationship with the Chinese Merchants in conducting business, while the KUD, who 
represent the state’s hands, do not offer a good price and do not have a long history of 
economic transactions with the Moluccan traders (Beckmann, 2007: 201). The producers 
and the Chinese middlemen complement one another, especially during the clove harvest. 
Beckmann points out that although the State control under the New Order regime was 
omnipotent, people still have autonomic ways of running their business without state 
interventions. Autonomic transactions aren’t limited people who run and live in the 
upland or any other isolated areas as James Scott describes in The Art of not Being Governed 
(2010). 
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